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Abstract
Due to the inherent robustness of segmentation models,
traditional norm-bounded attack methods show limited ef-
fect on such type of models. In this paper, we focus on
generating unrestricted adversarial examples for semantic
segmentation models. We demonstrate a simple and effec-
tive method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples
using conditional generative adversarial networks (CGAN)
without any hand-crafted metric. The naı¨ve implementa-
tion of CGAN, however, yields inferior image quality and
low attack success rate. Instead, we leverage the SPADE
(Spatially-adaptive denormalization) structure with an ad-
ditional loss item to generate effective adversarial attacks
in a single step. We validate our approach on the popular
Cityscapes and ADE20K datasets, and demonstrate that our
synthetic adversarial examples are not only realistic, but
also improve the attack success rate by up to 41.0% com-
pared with the state of the art adversarial attack methods
including PGD.
1. Introduction
Despite their impressive accuracy and wide adaption,
deep learning (DL) models remain fragile to adversarial at-
tacks [41, 5, 33], which raises serious concerns for deploy-
ing them into real-world applications, especially in safety
and security-critical systems.
Extensive efforts have been made to combat these adver-
sarial attacks: robust models are trained such that they are
not easily evaded by adversarial examples [15, 34, 27]. Al-
though these defense methods improve the models’ robust-
ness, they are mostly limited to addressing norm-bounded
attacks such as PGD [27], in which, human is not supposed
to differentiate between original clean images and adversar-
ial examples. However, two similar but non-identical im-
ages may also contain consistent semantic information from
human perspective; e.g., a slightly rotated variant of an im-
age is semantically similar to the original one [11]. Since
such changes (e.g., lighting condition, certain textures, ro-
tation, etc.) do not interfere with the human perception, a
robust ML model should also remain invariant to these re-
alistic changes [42].
However, such realistic variants of the clean images tend
to have high attack success rate for robust models designed
to defend norm-bounded attacks [39]. Thus, the realistic
adversarial attacks beyond norm bound remain a major con-
cern to those robust models, which spur extensive efforts to
explore stronger and realistic adversarial attacks, e.g., using
Wasserstein bound measurement [45], realistic image trans-
formations [12] etc. In particular, [39] propose unrestricted
adversarial attacks using conditional GAN for the image
classification models, a big step toward realistic attacks
beyond human crafted constrains. However, due to their
model design, they are mostly restricted to low-resolution
images—for high resolution, the generated images are not
very realistic.
The problem of achieving realistic adversarial attacks
and defenses aggravate further for more difficult visual
recognition tasks such as semantic segmentation, where
one needs to attack order of magnitude more pixels while
achieving a consistent human perception. It is essential to
make the segmentation models robust against adversarial at-
tacks, especially due to their applicability in autonomous
driving [13], medical imaging [36, 38], and computer-aided
diagnose system [28]. Unfortunately, we show that existing
attack methods primarily designed for simple classification
tasks do not generalize well to semantic segmentation. Be-
sides, the inherent robustness of segmentation models [1]
make existed adversarial attack methods less effective. For
instance, following the work of [1], we show that for seg-
mentation tasks the norm-bound perturbation becomes hu-
man visible since larger bounds are required for launching a
successful attack. The unrestricted adversarial attack, on the
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
02
35
4v
3 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
9 N
ov
 20
19
Figure 1. Illustrating the effectiveness of generated unrestricted adversarial example compared to norm bounded attacks. The 1st
column shows a real image from Cityscapes dataset and its prediction result of DRN-105 segmentation network. The 2nd and 3rd columns
show the result of applying PGD and AdvGAN generated perturbation to real images, respectively. In the 4th column, PGD is applied to
a synthesized image generated by SPADE, while the 5th column shows AdvSPADE’s unrestricted adversarial image that completely fools
DRN-105. Note that, there are conspicuous noises in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th column images. The segmentation results are still good for the
1st, 2nd and 4th columns. While 3rd column shows better attack performance than traditional norm-bounded attacks, it is still worse than
ours. In contrast, in our case (5th column) the image is free from noise, it preserves the objects critical to driving (e.g., street lamps, cars,
buildings), with slight differences in colors and textures that do not affect the semantics for a human driver. However, the prediction of the
segmentation model is totally wrong. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our unrestricted adversarial attacks for segmentation models.
other hand, is not constrained by the norm bounded budget,
which can expose more vulnerabilities of a given machine
learning model. However, the quality and resolution of the
unrestricted adversarial images generated by those methods
are low and limited to simple images like the handwritten
digits.
In this paper, we present the first realistic unrestricted
adversarial attack, AdvSPADE, for semantic segmenta-
tion models. Figure 1 illustrates the effectiveness of our
proposed method. To generate realistic images, we use
SPADE [35], a state-of-the-art conditional generative model
to generate high-resolution images (up to 1 million pixels).
We then add an adversarial loss term on the original SPADE
architecture to fool the target model. Thus, we create a wide
variety of adversarial examples from a single image in a sin-
gle step. Empirical results show that we can generate real-
istic and more successful adversarial attacks than existing
norm-bounded or GAN based attacks. We further show that
augmenting the training data with such realistic adversarial
examples have the potential to improve the models’ robust-
ness.
This paper makes the following contributions: (1) We
propose a new realistic attack for semantic segmentation
which defeats the existing state-of-the-art robust models.
We demonstrate the existence of a rich variety of unre-
stricted adversarial examples besides the previously known
ones. (2) We demonstrate that augmenting the training
dataset with our new adversarial examples have the poten-
tial of improving the robustness of existing models. (3)
We present an empirical evaluation of our approach using
two popular semantic segmentation dataset. First, we eval-
uate the quality of our generated adversarial examples using
Amazon Mechanical Turk and demonstrate that our samples
are indistinguishable to natural images for humans. Second,
we further show that our adversarial samples improve the
attack success rate up to 41%.
2. Related Work
Semantic Segmentation. It can be considered as a multi-
output classification task that provides more fine-granular
information in the prediction [4]. Although plenty of net-
work architectures have been proposed to address semantic
segmentation task efficiently [36, 25, 6, 3], very few stud-
ies [1, 48] look into the robustness of this class of networks
against adversarial examples.
Adversarial Attacks. Adversarial examples are carefully
crafted to mislead the DL models’ predictions, while still
perceived identical or similar semantics with original im-
ages to the human. Researchers have proposed multiple
methods for generating adversarial examples for the image
classification tasks [15, 23, 5, 27], where the target model
is fooled by the adversarial images. Hand-crafted metrics,
such as Lp norm bound [27, 14] and Wesstrasien distance
[45], are applied to the generation process to preserve the
semantic meaning of the adversarial examples to human.
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN ), popular for
image manipulation [50, 24, 18, 53], image-to-image trans-
lation [20, 43, 35], etc., was also leveraged to generate ad-
versarial examples. Xiao et al. [46] proposed AdvGAN
to generate norm-bounded perturbation for the classifica-
tion task. Song et al. [39] used GAN to generate unre-
stricted adversarial attacks for image classification. By
leveraging Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Net-
work (AC-GAN ) [31], the model was able to generate low-
quality adversarial examples from scratch and beyond any
norm bound. [44] further proposed a new generative model,
AT -GAN , to learn a transformation between a pre-trained
GAN and an adversarial GAN . Concurrent to our work,
[10] leveraged GAN to generate adaptive unrestricted ex-
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amples for classification. Compared to the restricted image
manipulation or local image editing attacks, one of the key
features of these unrestricted attacks is that it can gener-
ate more realistic images semantically similar (may not be
identical) to original benign images. Thus, these images can
fool even the robust ML models that can withstand norm-
bounded restricted adversarial examples.
However, these GAN -based attack methods mainly fo-
cus on classification tasks, and as we will show in Section 5,
do not generalize well for segmentation tasks. The one clos-
est to us, Song et al. [39], adopt two-step procedures: first
train AC-GAN to generate benign images and then opti-
mize an adversarial loss objective function w.r.t the input
noise z of AC-GAN . In this setting, the variety of unre-
stricted adversarial examples is restricted by the dimension
of z, usually fixed to a small number (10,100,256). Thus,
they tend not to work well in high-resolution datasets. In
contrast, we combine the image generation and unrestricted
adversarial image generation into a single stage by adding
an adversarial loss item in its objective function, and opti-
mize them together. This leads to a better attack success
rate and a larger mIoU drop than Song’s method, as shown
in Section 5.
A few studies focused on the adversarial attack on mod-
ern semantic segmentation networks. [1] conducted the
first systematic analysis about the effect of multiple adver-
sarial attack methods on different modern semantic segmen-
tation network architectures across two large-scale datasets.
[48] propose a new attack method called Dense Adversary
Generation (DAG), which generates a group of adversar-
ial examples for a bunch of state-of-the-art segmentation
and detection deep networks. However, all of the attack
methods rely on norm-bounded perturbations, which only
cover a small fraction of all the feasible adversarial exam-
ples. [8] further advances the restricted attacks using sur-
rogate loss functions for semantic segmentation to make
non-differential IOU loss to be approximate differential,
however, due to the expensive computationally, traditional
norm-bounded attack methods such as PGD, FGSM are
more widely used in practise.
Defense Methods. Adversarial training is the state-of-
the-art method for training robust classifiers [15, 26, 37,
41, 17, 32, 49, 27]. Besides, [1] evaluated other defense
methods like the input transformation, including rescaling,
JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, HSV jitter, grayscale
against adversarial attack on semantic segmentation net-
works. These input transformation methods, however, were
shown to rely on obfuscated gradients and give a false sense
of robustness [2]. Thus, [2] endorsed the robustness of
the model trained with adversarial training.In this paper, we
demonstrate that the robustness can be improved by training
with examples generated by our method.
3. Generating Adversarial Examples
We will now introduce our methodology for generating
unrestricted adversarial examples for semantic segmenta-
tion. For this purpose, we leverage a conditional Generative
Adversarial Networks, SPADE. The main goal of a stan-
dard conditional GAN is to synthesize realistic images that
will fool the discriminator. The generation of adversarial at-
tack, however, also requires to fool the segmentation model
under attack. Hence, we add an additional loss function
to fool both the discriminator and the segmentation model.
Figure 2 shows the overall workflow. The rest of the section
describes the steps in details.
Unrestricted Adversarial Examples. Consider I as a set
of images and C be the set of all possible categories for I.
Suppose o : O ⊆ I → C is an oracle that can map any
image from its domain O to C correctly. A classification
model F : I → C can also provide a class prediction for
any given images in I. Under the assumption that F 6= o,
an unrestricted adversarial example x is any image which
meets following requirements [39]: x ⊆ O, o(x) 6= F(x).
Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks. A Con-
ditional Generative Adversarial Network [29] consists of
a generator G and a discriminator D and they are both
conditioned on auxiliary information y. Combining ran-
dom noise z and extra information y as input, G is able
to map it to a realistic image. The discriminator aims to
distinguish the real images and synthetic images from the
Generator. G and D correspond to a minimax two-player
game and can be formalized as minGmaxD V (G,D) =
Ex∼Pdata(x)[logD(x|y)] + Ez∼Pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z|y)))]
Unrestricted Adversarial Loss. We design an adversar-
ial loss term for the unrestricted adversarial examples gen-
eration. We mainly focus on the untargeted attack in this
paper though our approach is general and can be simply ap-
plied on targeted attack. Intuitively, the SPADE generator
is trained to mislead the prediction of target segmentation
network. The synthetic images are not only required to fool
the discriminator for the conditional GAN but also need to
be mis-segmented by the target segmentation network. To
achieve this goal, we introduce the target segmentation net-
work into the training phase and aim to maximize the loss
of the segmentation model while keeping the quality and
semantic meaning of the synthetic images. We denote the
target segmentation network by S, SPADE generator by G,
input semantic label by y, and the input random vector by
z. We define the untargeted version of Unrestricted Adver-
sarial Loss as follows:
LATK = −Ez∼Pz(z) log f(S(G(z|y)), y) (1)
We select Dice Loss [40] as the objective function f . An
image encoder E processes a real image I and generates a
mean vector µE(I) and a variance vector σE(I) and then
compute the noise input z according to reparameterization
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Figure 2. Illustration of proposed AdvSPADE Architecture for generating unrestricted adversarial examples. Image encoderE takes
real images x as input to compute mean and variance vectors (µ(x), σ(x)) and apply reparameterization trick to generate random noise z.
SPADE generator G considers z and semantic labels s and generates synthetic images x′. Next, x′s are fed into a fixed pre-trained target
segmentation network S and encouraged to mislead S’s predictions by maximizing adversarial loss between predictions and semantic
labels. Meanwhile, x′, as SPADE discriminator D’s input, also aims to fool D. D is trained to reliably distinguish between generated (x′)
and real images (x). Random sampled  brings randomness into the model so that G can generate various adversarial examples. Notice
that, due to the adversarial loss item, prediction results at the top left corner of the figure are completely mis-segmented.
trick [22].
z = µE(I) + σE(I) · ,  ∼ N (0, I) (2)
The complete objective function of AdvSPADE then can
be written as:
min
G,E
(( max
D1,D2,D3
∑
k=1,2,3
LGAN (G,Dk))
+λ0
∑
k=1,2,3
LFM (G,Dk)) + λ1LV GG(G)
+λ2LKLD(E) + λ3LATK(S,G)) (3)
We follow the definition of feature matching loss LFM
and perceptual loss LV GG in [43]. The feature match-
ing loss, LFM (G,Dk) = E(y,x)
∑T
i=1
1
Ni
[||D(i)k (y, x) −
D
(i)
k (s,G(y))||1], is able to stabilizes the GAN training by
minimizing the distance between features of synthesis and
real images from multiple layers of the discriminator. The
VGG perceptual loss (LV GG(G) =
∑N
(i=1)
1
Mi
[||F (i)(x)−
F (i)(G(y))||1]) plays a similar role as LFM by introducing
a pretrained VGG network. For LKLD, we borrow the def-
inition from [35]. LKLD = DKL(q(z|x)||p(z)). It calcu-
lates the KL divergence between a prior distribution p(z), a
standard Gaussian distribution and a variational distribution
q(z|x). To speed up the generation process as well as the
quality of synthesized images, we follow Spatially-adaptive
denormalization, as proposed by [35].
Spatially-adaptive denormalization. Our model uses
SPADE architecture [35] as the conditional GAN model,
where the Batch Normalization [19] is replaced with
Spatially-adaptive denormalization. This method is proved
to maintain the semantic segmentation information which
will get lost during the subsampling. Please refer to supple-
mentary materials for details.
4. Experimental Set-up
Datasets. We evaluate AdvSPADE on two large image
segmentation datasets: Citsycapes [9] and ADE20K [55].
Cityscapes contains street view images from 50 German
cities and 19 semantic classes, and it consists of 3000 train-
ing and 500 validation images. ADE20K covers 150 seman-
tic classes in multiple real world scenes, where the training
and validation set contains 20100 and 2000 images respec-
tively.
Training. Following [35], we apply the Spectral Norm [30]
in all layers of generator and discriminator. We train Ad-
vSPADE with 50 epochs on Cityscapes. For ADE20K, we
run 100 epochs (rather than 200 epochs reported in [35] due
to ADE20K’s large size and computation limits). We set
the learning rate of the generator and discriminator both
equal to 0.0002 and start to decay learning rate linearly
from 50th epoch when trained on ADE20K. We employ the
ADAM [21] with β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999. In Equation 3,
we set λ0 = 10, λ1 = 10, λ2 = 0.05 for both Cityscapes
and ADE20K and λ3 = 10 for Cityscapes, λ3 = 70 for
ADE20K respectively. All experiments are done on a sin-
gle NVIDIA TITAN Xp GPU.
Baseline Models. We compare AdvSPADE generated at-
tacks with traditional norm-bounded attacks in two settings:
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(i) real images with perturbation and (ii) GAN-generated
clean images with perturbation. For (ii), we generate clean
images with vanilla SPADE and then add norm-bounded
perturbation over the synthetic images. For a better com-
parison, we choose the same segmentation networks as tar-
get networks for each dataset as [35] mentioned: DRN-D-
105 [52] for Cityscapes, Upernet-101 for ADE20K [47].
Besides, we also select several state-of-the-art open source
segmentation networks to evaluate the transferability of Ad-
vSPADE as a black box setting: DRN-38, DRN-22 [52, 51],
DeepLab-V3 [7], PSPNet-34-8s [54] for Cityscapes, PPM-
18, MobilenetV2, Upernet-50, PPM-101 [56] for ADE20K.
We also compare AdvSPADE with two GAN-based at-
tacks [46, 39] on Cityscapes. For AdvGAN, we adapt the
GAN structure of [46] for the segmentation task. First,
we change the classification target network f to the seg-
mentation target network DRN-105 for Cityscapes. Sec-
ond, we change the loss function of adversarial loss items
from cross-entropy to dice loss for a fair comparison with
ours. We reproduce their method with two different hyper-
parameter settings (λadv = −1,−100) (see Table 5).
We implement Song et al.’s [39] method on SPADE.
We first train a SPADE to generate clean images and fix
SPADE parameters. Second, we apply their designed ob-
jective function, substitute target classification network f to
DRN-105, and change the loss function of adversarial loss
item from cross-entropy to dice loss. We set the dimension
of input random noise z to 256. We run SPADE with 50
epochs and then run another 50 epochs to optimize adver-
sarial loss on Cityscapes. We also test the transferability of
Song et al.’s attack on a black-box setting (see Table 1).
Evaluation metric. Due to the dense output property of
the semantic segmentation task, the evaluation of the attack
success rate is different from that of the classification [39].
Let IH×W×C be a set of RGB images with height H and
width W and channel C. Let LH×W be the set of seman-
tic labels for the corresponding images from I. Suppose
o : O ⊆ I → L is an oracle that can map any images
from its domain O which presents all images that look re-
alistic to humans to L correctly. A segmentation model
S : I → L can provide pixel-wise predictions for any
given images in I. We evaluate the following two cate-
gories of adversarial examples: 1) Given a constant  > 0
and a hand-craft norm ‖·‖, a restricted adversarial example
x is an image that meets the following conditions: x ⊆ O,
∃x′ ⊆ O ‖x− x′‖ < ,
∑
i,j(oi,j(x)6=Si,j(x))
H·W > θ. (2) An
unrestricted adversarial example x is an image that meets
following requirement: x ⊆ O,
∑
i,j(oi,j(x)6=Si,j(x))
H·W > θ.
Here, oi,j(x),Si,j(x) stands for the prediction given by or-
acle o and segmentation network S at pixel x(i, j) respec-
tively. θ ∈ [0, 1] is a hyperparameter that is set to θ = 0.95.
Given the nature of semantic segmentation task, misclas-
sifying a single pixel does not lead an image to fall into
the class of adversarial examples. A legitimate adversarial
example should have the property that the majority of pix-
els in it are misclassified (measured by mIoU score), and
the adversarial image still looks realistic to humans (mea-
sured by FID score) with the same semantic meaning as the
original images (measured by Amazon Turk). In particular,
we use following three measures: 1. Mean Intersection-
over-Union (mIoU): For measuring the effect of different
attack methods on the target networks, we measure the drop
in recognition accuracy using mIoU score which is widely
used in semantic segmentation tasks [9, 55]—lower mIoU
score means better adversarial example. 2. Fre´chet Incep-
tion Distance (FID): We use FID [16] to compute the dis-
tance between the distribution of our adversarial examples
and the distribution of the real images; small FID stands for
the high quality of generated images. 3. Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (AMT): AMT is used to verify the success of our
unrestricted adversarial attack. Here, we randomly select
250 generated adversarial images under two experimental
settings from each dataset to generate AMT assignments.
Each assignment is answered by 3 different workers and
each worker has 3 minutes to make decision. We use the
result of a majority vote as each assignment’s final answer.
5. Experiment Result
Evaluating Generated Adversarial Images. Here, we
compare the adversarial images generated from the origi-
nal real images and the clean synthetic images created by
vanilla SPADE using mIoU (Table 1) and FID scores (Ta-
ble 2). Table 1 shows that compared to vanilla SPADE,
generated images under whitebox attack can lead to a gi-
ant decline on mIoU score (from 0.62 to 0.01 for DRN-
105, from 0.403 to 0.011 for Upernet-101). On differ-
ent network architectures, our adversarial examples can
also decrease mIoU (around 20% on Cityscapes, 30% on
ADE20K) showing strong transferability of our examples
across models.
Compare to vanilla SPADE, the FID of our adver-
sarial examples increases slightly (62.939 to 67.302 on
Cityscapes, 33.9 to 53.49 on ADE20K, see Table 2) in-
dicating our samples have comparable quality and variety.
Note that we only train AdvSPADE half epochs as reported
in [35] and achieve 53.49 FID on ADE20K, still smaller
than other leading semantic image synthetic models. Fig-
ure 3 shows qualitative results. Moreover, by introducing
an image encoder and KL Divergence loss, we can generate
multi-modal stylized adversarial examples which are shown
in the supplementary materials.
Norm-bounded Adversarial attacks. We compare the at-
tack success rate of AdvSPADE with the state-of-the-art
norm bounded adversarial attacks, including FGSM and
PGD [15, 27], for two dataset. We set the l∞ norm bound
size  to {0.25, 1, 8, 32} for both FGSM and PGD. For
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Figure 3. Visual Results on ADE20K. As we can see, the semantic meaning of the generated adversarial examples are well aligned to the
original image, but are different in the style and mis-predicted by the segmentation model. For example, the color and strip on bed in the
first two columns are changed, but human still perceive them as bed while the segmentation model predict the wrong label. The results
demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for generating realistic adversarial examples that mislead the target model.
Table 1. The effectiveness of our proposed attack (AdvSPADE) under mIoU metric under both whitebox and transfer based black-
box attacks. Lower mIoU means better attack. Results show that AdvSPADE successfully misleads the segmentation models while both
the real and synthetic images are predicted correctly by the models.
Cityscapes ADE20K
Attacks Seg Model Real Images SPADE Song et al [39] AdvSPADE Seg Model Real Images SPADE AdvSPADE
Whitebox DRN-105 0.756 0.620 0.461 0.010 Upernet-101 0.420 0.403 0.011
Transfer- DRN-38 0.714 0.551 0.520 0.407 MobilenetV2 0.348 0.317 0.110
based DRN-22 0.68 0.526 0.489 0.387 PPM-18 0.340 0.362 0.102
blackbox DeepLab-V3 0.68 0.54 0.501 0.425 Upernet-50 0.404 0.395 0.096
PSPNet-34-8s 0.691 0.529 0.495 0.441 PPM-101 0.422 0.409 0.078
Table 2. FID Comparison between our AdvSPADE and state-
of-art semantic image synthesis models. The results show that
AdvSPADE outperforms Pix2PixHD and CRN and achieve com-
parable FID with vanilla SPADE on Cityscapes.
Dataset
Model Vanilla SPADE Pix2PixHD CRN AdvSPADE
Cityscapes 62.939 95.0 104.7 67.302
ADE20K 33.9 81.8 73.3 53.49
PGD, we follow the [23, 1] and set number of attack it-
erations to min{b + 4c, d1.25e}. We apply FGSM and
PGD on both real images and synthetic images by vanilla
SPADE, and compare their mIoU scores and FID with ours.
The results (see Table 3) show that PGD and FGSM at-
tacks can barely attack target networks with small bound
size ( = 0.25, 1, 8). For instance, FGSM attack with bound
size  = 1 on real and vanilla SPADE generated images
achieve 0% attack success rate on DRN-105 network on
Cityscapes. In contrast, AdvSPADE achieves high attack
success rate (84.4% and 57.7% on DRN-105 and Upernet-
101, respectively).
Table 4 further reveals that for both FGSM and PGD at-
tack, to decrease the mIoU to the same level as AdvSPADE
(mIoU = 0.01), the generated perturbation becomes con-
spicuous ( = 32) so that human can easily distinguish ad-
versarial examples from clean images. FID also reflects the
decline of adversarial images’ quality. Secondly, adversar-
ial examples generated by FGSM and PGD attack can not
make mIoU drop down to the same level as AdvSPADE if it
is required to maintain the quality of the samples. Consider
the adversarial samples on Cityscapes generated by vanilla
SPADE and add perturbation with  = 1, their FID (64.455)
is comparable with our samples, but mIoU (0.355) is much
larger than ours (0.01). Figure 4 illustrates the difference
between AdvSPADE samples and norm-bounded samples
on the same level of mIoU score. We can easily see the
noise pattern in norm-bounded samples rather than in our
examples.
We further compare the transferability of FGSM and
PGD with our AdvSPADE on black-box setting and observe
similar conclusion. The detailed results are shown in sup-
plementary material.
GAN-based Adversarial Attack. Here, we compare the
mIoU drop between Song’s unrestricted attack [39] and Ad-
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Table 3. Attack Success Rate under white-box setting for our AdvSPADE and norm-bounded attacks (FGSM,PGD) with bound sizes:
0.25, 1, 8, 32. AdvSPADE achieves significantly higher attack success rates on both datasets.
DRN-105 Upernet-101
Bound Size Real Images Vanilla SPADE Bound Size Real Images Vanilla SPADE
Method () +Perturbation +Perturbation Method () +Perturbation +Perturbation
FGSM
0.25 0% 0%
FGSM
0.25 0.4% 0.9%
1 0% 0% 1 0.9% 1.8%
8 0% 0% 8 2.6% 2.6%
32 15.6% 16.4% 32 6.1% 8.0%
PGD
0.25 0% 0%
PGD
0.25 0.4% 0.9%
1 0% 0% 1 0.8% 2.8%
8 22.2% 43.4% 8 11.5% 24.2%
32 33.8% 47.2% 32 39.0% 44.1%
AdvSPADE 84.4% AdvSPADE 57.7%
Table 4. Attack Effectiveness under white-box setting for our AdvSPADE and norm-bounded attacks (FGSM,PGD) with bound sizes:
0.25, 1, 8, 32. We show mIoU and FID scores (FID in parentheses) of AdvSPADE generated examples and norm-bounded attacks on
both real and standard SPADE generated images. The results indicate that traditional norm-bounded attacks need large size perturbation
to achieve similar mIoU as AdvSPADE, which will be easily detectable by the human. However, our unrestricted adversarial examples
remain invisible to humans, which reveals the effectiveness of our proposed method.
DRN-105 (Cityscapes) Upernet-101 (ADE20K)
Bound Size Real Images Vanilla SPADE Bound Size Real Images Vanilla SPADE
Method () +Perturbation +Perturbation Method () +Perturbation +Perturbation
FGSM
0.25 0.557 0.431 (63.354)
FGSM
0.25 0.346 0.286 (33.821)
1 0.408 0.355 (64.455) 1 0.278 0.221 (35.254)
8 0.196 0.152 (82.144) 8 0.178 0.152 (60.563)
32 0.009 0.009 (248.175) 32 0.070 0.048 (166.724)
PGD
0.25 0.557 0.431 (63.354)
PGD
0.25 0.346 0.286 (33.821)
1 0.339 0.287 (63.971) 1 0.276 0.181 (34.876)
8 0.036 0.022 (69.162) 8 0.070 0.022 (62.289)
32 0.013 0.009 (89.998) 32 0.013 0.007 (113.553)
AdvSPADE 0.01 (67.302) AdvSPADE 0.011 (53.49)
vSPADE on Cityscapes (see Table 1 ). The results show
[39] generated examples can only lead a small mIoU drop
on a white box setting (from 0.62 to 0.461), while AdvS-
PADE generated images drop to 0.010. The transferabil-
ity of their examples under the blackbox setting is also
limited—mIoU drop of 3% (Song et al.) vs. 15% (AdvS-
PADE), demonstrating limitations of their attacks.
Table 5. Comparison between AdvGAN and AdvSPADE ours
on DRN-105. We present the mIoU score and attack success rate
of AdvGAN [46] with two different hyper-parameter setting on
Cityscapes. The results show the ineffectiveness of AdvGAN on
segmentation task even with large norm-bound size.
Method Bound Size Attack Success Rate mIoU
0.25 0% 0.350
AdvGAN 1 0% 0.344
8 0% 0.264
32 0% 0.351
0.25 0% 0.340
AdvGAN 1 0% 0.338
(λadv = -100) 8 7.8% 0.055
32 6.4% 0.044
AdvSPADE(Ours) - 84.4% 0.01
We also compare the attack success rate and mIoU drop
between AdvGAN [46] and AdvSPADE (see Table 5).
Since AdvGAN can be considered a special norm-bounded
attack method, we follow the same experimental setting for
bound size with traditional norm-bounded attacks. With
suggested hyper-parameter setting in [46], AdvGAN gen-
erated examples show a 0% attack success rate and only
0.351 mIoU drop even when bound size is as large as 32.
After adjusting the hyper-parameter, generated adversarial
examples can only attack target segmentation network suc-
cessfully with large bound size (Attack success rate is 7.8%,
mIoU is 0.055 at bound size is 8). However, in such a case,
we can clearly see the noise pattern from adversarial exam-
ples. From our experimental results, it turns out that Ad-
vGAN’s attack effectiveness is even worse than the tradi-
tional norm-bound attacks, showing that its applicability to
only classification tasks.
Table 6. Ablation Study Results for Cityscapes Dataset
Method FID mIoU Attack Success Rate
w/o Feature Matching Loss 79.76 0.027 57.6%
w/o VGG Loss 80.142 0.026 56.0%
w/o Adv Loss 62.939 0.62 0%
AdvSPADE 67.302 0.01 84%
Table 6 further shows an ablation study on Cityscapes
Dataset to evaluate effectiveness of each component in Ad-
vSPADE. The results show that both Feature Matching loss
and VGG loss terms are important for the quality and ef-
fectiveness of adversarial examples generation. Removing
any of them causes FID to increase, and attack success rate
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Figure 4. Comparison of norm-bounded vs. AdvSPADE generated samples at the same mIoU level on ADE20K. We Apply different
attack methods to descend mIoU score to the same level (∼ 0.01) and show the visual comparison. FGSM and PGD are applied with
 = 32. The noise patterns in norm-bounded adversarial images (First four columns) rather than in our examples indicate that our
examples can attack target networks successfully, yet keep undetectable to human.
to drop. Besides, on removing adversarial loss term AdvS-
PADE degenerates to vanilla SPADE, which can only gen-
erate benign images.
Human Evaluation. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT), we evaluate how a human perceives generated ad-
versarial images. A detailed result is presented in the Sup-
plementary part. This is done in two settings:
(1) Semantic Consistency Test: If the semantic meanings of
our adversarial examples are consistent with their respec-
tive ground truth labels, humans will segment the examples
correctly. However, asking workers to segment every pixel
is time-consuming and inefficient. Instead, we give AMT
workers a pair of images: a generated adversarial image and
a semantic label (half of the images pairs are matched, and
rest are mismatched) and ask them if the semantic mean-
ing of given synthetic image is consistent with the given se-
mantic label. We notice that users can identify the semantic
meaning of our adversarial examples precisely (94.4% for
Cityscapes, 98.0% for ADE20K). This shows although a
segmentation network completely fails to handle our adver-
sarial examples, humans can successfully identify the se-
mantic meaning, which proves our attack’s success.
(2) Fidelity AB Test: We compare the visual fidelity of
AdvSPADE with vanilla SPADE. We give workers the se-
mantic ground truth label and two generated images by
AdvSPADE and vanilla SPADE respectively and ask them
to select the more appropriate image corresponding to the
ground truth label. 68.4% and 75.2% users favor our ex-
amples over vanilla SPADE for Cityscapes and ADE20K
dataset indicating competitive visual fidelity of our adver-
sarial images.
Robustness Evaluation. We first show that robust train-
ing with norm-bounded adversarial images can defend re-
stricted adversarial attacks where perturbation is added ei-
ther on real or synthetic images. However, our unrestricted
adversarial examples can still attack these robust models
successfully [15]. We then present the experimental re-
sults of a more robust segmentation model built based on
our unrestricted examples. We follow the training setting
introduced by [27]: we select PGD as the attack method
and set the adversarial training epoch = 100 on Cityscapes,
50 on ADE20K, norm-bound size  = 8, attack itera-
tion = 10, step size = 1. After the training phase, we use
PGD with the same setting to generate norm-bounded per-
turbation and add it on both real and synthetic images by
vanilla SPADE. We find that real and synthesized images
with perturbation make mIoU decrease to 0.325 and 0.225
on robust DRN-105, 0.239 and 0.197 on robust Upernet-
101, respectively. In contrast, our adversarial examples can
achieve 0.033 mIoU score on robust DRN-105, and 0.024
on robust Upernet-101 indicating that our examples can
successfully surpass the robust models trained with norm-
bounded adversarial examples. Next, we train a model 50
epochs with our unrestricted adversarial examples on the
Cityscapes dataset and then apply PGD to attack. The re-
sult shows that PGD attack can only achieve 1.8% attack
success rate on DRN-105. Since l∞ norm-bound examples
are unknown for the robust model defended by our samples,
the low success rate reflects models gain stronger robustness
from adversarial training with AdvSPADE examples.
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6. Conclusion
This paper explores the existence of adversarial exam-
ples beyond norm-bounded metric on the state-of-the-art
semantic segmentation neural networks. By modifying the
loss function of SPADE architecture, we are able to gen-
erate high quality unrestricted realistic adversarial exam-
ples, which mislead segmentation networks’ behavior. We
demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our method
by comparing with traditional norm-bounded attacks. We
also show that our generated adversarial examples can eas-
ily surpass the state-of-the-art defense method, which raises
new concerns about the security of segmentation networks.
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